This paper analyzes the causes of equity pledge, external conduction mechanisms, and economic consequences from the perspective of insurance participation by integrating insurance participation, equity pledge, and stock price crash risk into a unified framework. An empirical analysis of sample data from listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2007-2021, indicates that equity pledge reduces the risk of collapse as companies hedge the risk induced by the equity pledge. Further research has revealed that insurance participation can mitigate stock price crash risk brought by equity pledge through a regulatory effect, which is more pronounced for private companies and those with a high shareholding ratio, and companies in manufacturing industry. This is because private companies have a higher demand for capital as their property rights are not state-owned, the degree of separation of powers and agency conflicts is greater in companies held by large shareholders, manufacturing companies usually have stable earnings and cash flow performance, and the financial support provided by insurers for equity pledges at risk can effectively reduce the risk of their collapse.
Copyright: © 2024 Fangjing Hao. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
