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PloS one. 2021 Apr 26;16(4):e0249900. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0249900 Q22.92024

Management equity incentives and stock price crash risk: "Golden handcuffs" or "gold watch"

管理层股权激励与股票崩盘风险:“金手铐”还是“金手表”? 翻译改进

Xiaohua Zhou  1, Jinshi Wan  1, Yi Yang  1, Xiangyu Gan  2

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作者单位

  • 1 School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China.
  • 2 Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom.
  • DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0249900 PMID: 33901202

    摘要 Ai翻译

    This paper expands the previous research on management equity incentives (MEIs) and stock price crash risk by distinguishing between the "gold watch" region and the "golden handcuff" regions in MEIs. By using an estimation of the gold watch region and the golden handcuff regions based on 6,675 annual observations of China's A-share listed companies, the stock price crash risk is found to be negatively correlated with MEIs in the golden handcuff regions (0-10%, 30%-100%) and is positively correlated with MEIs in the gold watch region (10%-30%). A further investigation of the mediating effects of peer effects on MEIs and the stock price crash risk reveals that peer effects have a partial mediation effect at the level of peer managers' shareholding and mediate the relationship between MEIs and the stock price crash risk.

    Keywords:management equity incentives; stock price crash risk

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    期刊名:Plos one

    缩写:PLOS ONE

    ISSN:1932-6203

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    IF/分区:2.9/Q2

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    Management equity incentives and stock price crash risk: "Golden handcuffs" or "gold watch"