The impact of CEO ability on corporate behavior is dual-faceted. Based on the "rent-seeking hypothesis", this paper focuses on the "dark side" of CEO ability and suggests that CEO ability may hurt corporate behavior. Using the DEA method to measure CEO ability and selecting Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as a sample, we examine the relationship, mechanisms, and boundary conditions between CEO ability and stock price crash risk. Our study finds that CEO ability exacerbates stock price crash risk positively. Mechanism tests based on CEO tenure, agency conflict, and litigation risk reveal that CEO ability intensifies stock price crash risk for alleviating career concerns, seeking private gains, and risk avoidance, supporting the "rent-seeking hypothesis". Boundary condition tests based on internal and external governance environments show that internal control quality and external audit supervision can play a governance role in mitigating the exacerbating effect of CEO ability on stock price crash risk. The conclusions are of significant importance for companies, relevant departments, and global market participants to strengthen governance and supervision to prevent the negative impact of CEO ability on stock prices, thereby promoting the stable development of global financial markets.

Keywords: Agency conflict; CEO ability; Career concerns; Litigation risk; Rent-seeking; Stock price crash risk.

© 2024 The Authors.

首席执行官能力对企业行为的影响是双面的。基于“寻租假说”，本文聚焦于首席执行官能力的“暗面”，指出首席执行官的能力可能会损害企业行为。通过使用DEA方法衡量首席执行官能力，并选取2007年至2017年中国A股上市公司的数据作为样本，我们研究了首席执行官能力和股票价格崩盘风险之间的关系、机制以及边界条件。我们的研究表明，首席执行官能力会正向加剧股票价格崩盘风险。基于首席执行官任期、代理冲突和诉讼风险的机制测试表明，首席执行官的能力通过缓解职业担忧、寻求私人收益和避免风险来增强股票价格崩盘风险，支持了“寻租假说”。基于内部和外部治理环境的边界条件测试显示，内部控制质量和外部审计监督可以发挥治理作用，减轻首席执行官能力对股票价格崩盘风险加剧的影响。研究结论对于公司、相关监管部门以及全球市场参与者加强治理和监管以防止首席执行官能力对企业股价产生负面影响具有重要意义，从而促进全球金融市场稳定发展。

关键词：代理冲突；首席执行官能力；职业担忧；诉讼风险；寻租；股票价格崩盘风险。

© 2024 The Authors.