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Economic theory. 2008;35(3):607-611. doi: 10.1007/s00199-007-0239-2 Q31.12025

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

Ines Lindner

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0239-2

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期刊名:Economic theory

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ISSN:0938-2259

e-ISSN:1432-0479

IF/分区:1.1/Q3

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A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters