Medical ethics has historically been grounded in principles and values that can be logically deduced from the broader moral principles of ordinary life or common morality. This approach has recently been challenged by philosopher Rosamond Rhodes, who argues the opposite: namely, that medical ethics embodies a system of beliefs that cannot be logically deduced from the moral principles of daily living. She offers seven "counterexamples" that seek to show that common morality is not the universal source for medical ethics. This paper examines each of these counterexamples closely, explaining how they are flawed, in that they adopt oversimplified descriptions of common morality, inaccurate descriptions of optimal practice, or both, ultimately leading Rose to debunk straw scenarios. This paper then argues that the distinction between medical ethics based upon common morality and medical ethics based upon a specialized form of medical morality is not merely academic, but highly deleterious in clinical practice, as the latter approach shifts power from patients to philosophers.

Keywords: clinical ethics; common morality; medical morality.

© 2025 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

医学伦理学历来基于可以从普通生活或日常道德的更广泛道德原则中逻辑推导出来的原则和价值观。最近，哲学家罗莎蒙德·罗兹（Rosamond Rhodes）对此方法提出了挑战，她认为相反：即医学伦理学包含了一套信念体系，这些信念无法从日常生活中的道德原则中逻辑推导出来。她提供了七个“反例”，试图证明日常道德并非医学伦理的普遍来源。本文仔细分析了这七个反例，解释它们存在缺陷的原因，因为它们采用了对普通道德过于简化的描述或对最佳实践不准确的描述，或者两者兼有，最终导致罗兹驳斥了一些虚幻的情景。本文进一步论证了基于日常道德的医学伦理学与基于专业医疗道德体系的医学伦理学之间的区别不仅仅是学术上的问题，在临床实践中更是极具破坏性的，因为后者将权力从患者转移到哲学家手中。

关键词：临床伦理；日常道德；医学道德。

© 2025 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.