Samuel C Wiese,Torsten Heinrich
Samuel C Wiese
We calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of n-player, m-strategy normal-form games. To obtain the ensemble, we generate payoff matrices at random. Games with a unique pure strategy Nas...
Dynamic Games of Social Distancing During an Epidemic: Analysis of Asymmetric Solutions [0.03%]
流行病期间的社会疏远动态游戏：非对称解分析
Ioannis Kordonis,Athanasios-Rafail Lagos,George P Papavassilopoulos
Ioannis Kordonis
Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID-19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a co...
Modeling COVID-19 Pandemic with Hierarchical Quarantine and Time Delay [0.03%]
具有等级隔离和时间延迟的COVID-19疫情传播模型
Wei Yang
Wei Yang
COVID-19 comes out as a sudden pandemic disease within human population. The pandemic dynamics of COVID-19 needs to be studied in detail. A pandemic model with hierarchical quarantine and time delay is proposed in this paper. In the COVID-1...
Effects of Network Characteristics on Reaching the Payoff-Dominant Equilibrium in Coordination Games: A Simulation study [0.03%]
网络特征对协调博弈达到优势策略均衡的影响：基于模拟实验的分析
Vincent Buskens,Chris Snijders
Vincent Buskens
We study how payoffs and network structure affect reaching the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a [Formula: see text] coordination game that actors play with their neighbors in a network. Using an extensive simulation analysis of over 100,000...
Mark Kagan,Frederick van der Ploeg,Cees Withagen
Mark Kagan
Industria imports oil, produces final goods and wishes to mitigate global warming. Oilrabia exports oil and buys final goods from the other country. Industria uses the carbon tax to impose an import tariff on oil and steal some of Oilrabia'...
The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation [0.03%]
制度激励和自愿参与中的合作进化
Tatsuya Sasaki
Tatsuya Sasaki
Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, ...