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期刊名：Review of economic design

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ISSN：1434-4742

e-ISSN：1434-4750

IF/分区：0.4/Q4

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共收录本刊相关文章索引360条
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Up-front payment under RD rule [0.03%]
Ho-Chyuan Chen Ho-Chyuan Chen
Review of economic design. 2004;9(1):1-10. DOI:10.1007/s10058-004-0116-4 2004
To merge or not to merge: That is the question [0.03%]
Luis C. Corchón; Ramon Fauli-Oller Luis C. Corchón; Ramon Fauli-Oller
Review of economic design. 2004;9(1):11-30. DOI:10.1007/s10058-004-0117-3 2004
Tax implementability of fair allocations [0.03%]
Yukihiro Nishimura Yukihiro Nishimura
Review of economic design. 2004;9(1):31-41. DOI:10.1007/s10058-004-0118-2 2004
Implementation and orderings of public information [0.03%]
Colin M. Campbell Colin M. Campbell
Review of economic design. 2004;9(1):43-57. DOI:10.1007/s10058-004-0119-1 2004
On how size and composition of customer bases affect equilibrium in a duopoly with switching costs [0.03%]
Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen; Steinar Vagstad Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen; Steinar Vagstad
Review of economic design. 2004;9(1):59-71. DOI:10.1007/s10058-004-0120-8 2004
The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes [0.03%]
Roberto Burguet Roberto Burguet
Review of economic design. 2005;9(2):73-90. DOI:10.1007/s10058-005-0121-2 2005
Optimal money growth in a limited participation model with heterogeneous agents [0.03%]
Erdem Başçí; Ismail Saglam Erdem Başçí; Ismail Saglam
Review of economic design. 2005;9(2):91-108. DOI:10.1007/s10058-005-0122-1 2005
Manipulation of the Walrasian mechanism in production economies with unbounded short-selling [0.03%]
Laurence Kranich Laurence Kranich
Review of economic design. 2005;9(2):109-125. DOI:10.1007/s10058-005-0123-0 2005
The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense [0.03%]
Marc Fleurbaey Marc Fleurbaey
Review of economic design. 2005;9(2):145-166. DOI:10.1007/s10058-005-0124-z 2005
Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller [0.03%]
Bernard Caillaud; Jacques Robert Bernard Caillaud; Jacques Robert
Review of economic design. 2005;9(2):127-143. DOI:10.1007/s10058-005-0125-y 2005