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Andrei M. Gomberg; Francisco Marhuenda; Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín
John Duggan; Mark Fey
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Matthias Messner; Mattias K. Polborn
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César Martinelli
César Martinelli
Adam Meirowitz
Adam Meirowitz
Approval voting: three examples [0.03%]
Francesco De Sinopoli; Bhaskar Dutta; Jean-François Laslier
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A simple “market value” bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems [0.03%]
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Guillermo Owen; Ines Lindner; Scott L. Feld; Bernard Grofman; Leonard Ray