Kyung Hwan Baik,Jong Hwa Lee,Seokho Lee
Kyung Hwan Baik
We study a three-player Tullock contest in an endogenous-timing framework, focusing on the players' decisions on timing of effort exertion. In this model, there are two points in time at which the players may choose their effort levels. The...
Repugnant Conclusions [0.03%]
厌恶的结论
Dean Spears,Mark Budolfson
Dean Spears
The population ethics literature has long focused on attempts to avoid the repugnant conclusion. We show that a large set of social orderings that are conventionally understood to escape the repugnant conclusion do not in fact avoid it in a...
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects [0.03%]
带保留价格的序列独裁机制：异质对象
Bettina Klaus,Alexandru Nichifor
Bettina Klaus
We adapt a set of mechanisms introduced by Klaus and Nichifor (Econ Theory 70:665-684, 2020), serial dictatorship mechanisms with (individual) reservation prices, to the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clin...
Jiehua Chen,Sven Grottke
Jiehua Chen
We characterize one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles with a small number of alternatives and voters. We show that every single-peaked preference profile with two voters is one-dimensional Euclidean, and that every preference profil...
Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items [0.03%]
具有可能冗余项的成本分摊中计数规则的系统化方法研究
Gildas Sédry Fopa,Issofa Moyouwou,Joseph Siani
Gildas Sédry Fopa
For cost allocation problems with an existing set of indivisible public resources with heterogeneous individual needs and non-rivalry access, an axiomatization is provided for the allocation rule that proportionally charges agents for a giv...
Encarnación Algaba,Stefano Moretti,Eric Rémila et al.
Encarnación Algaba et al.
In many real world situations, the design of social rankings over agents or items from a given raking over groups or coalitions, to which these agents or items belong to, is of big interest. With this aim, we revise the lexicographic excell...
Takashi Hayashi
Takashi Hayashi
This paper studies aggregation of preferences under ignorance, in which everybody knows that the true probability distribution over outcomes lies in some objective set but knows nothing about which one in it is true or which one in it is mo...
Johannes Haushofer,Michala Iben Riis-Vestergaard,Jeremy Shapiro
Johannes Haushofer
Randomized controlled trials, which randomly allocate benefits to a treatment group and not a control group, ascribe differences in post-treatment welfare to the benefits being allocated. However, it is possible that potential recipients' w...
Xiaohui Bei,Guangda Huzhang,Warut Suksompong
Xiaohui Bei
We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in this setting have been established in previous works, the...
Edith Elkind,Piotr Faliszewski,Piotr Skowron et al.
Edith Elkind et al.
A committee selection rule (or, multiwinner voting rule) is a mapping that takes a collection of strict preference rankings and a positive integer k as input, and outputs one or more subsets of candidates of size k. In this paper we conside...