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Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 2006;2(2):285-299. doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhl011 Q21.22025

WHEN DOES AN OPTIONAL TARIFF NOT LEAD TO A PARETO IMPROVEMENT? THE AMBIGUOUS EFFECTS OF SELF-SELECTING NONLINEAR PRICING WHEN DEMAND IS INTERDEPENDENT OR FIRMS DO NOT MAXIMIZE PROFIT

当可选关税为何不会带来帕累托改进?需求相互依赖或企业未实现利润最大化时,自选择非线性定价的模糊效应

Panzar, J. C.

DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhl011

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Copyright © Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 中文内容为AI机器翻译,仅供参考!

期刊名:Journal of competition law & economics

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ISSN:1744-6414

e-ISSN:1744-6422

IF/分区:1.2/Q2

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WHEN DOES AN OPTIONAL TARIFF NOT LEAD TO A PARETO IMPROVEMENT? THE AMBIGUOUS EFFECTS OF SELF-SELECTING NONLINEAR PRICING WHEN DEMAND IS INTERDEPENDENT OR FIRMS DO NOT MAXIMIZE PROFIT