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Journal of finance. 2003;58(4):1557-1582. doi: 10.1111/1540-6261.00577 Q19.52025

Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section

Gerald Garvey; Todd Milbourn

DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00577

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期刊名:Journal of finance

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ISSN:0022-1082

e-ISSN:1540-6261

IF/分区:9.5/Q1

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Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section