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Review of economic design. 2008;12(1):33-44. doi: 10.1007/s10058-008-0042-y Q40.42025

A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires

Stefano Vannucci

DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0042-y

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期刊名:Review of economic design

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ISSN:1434-4742

e-ISSN:1434-4750

IF/分区:0.4/Q4

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A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires