This study aims at modeling the universal failure in preventing the outbreak of COVID-19 via real-world data from the perspective of complexity and network science. Through formalizing information heterogeneity and government intervention in the coupled dynamics of epidemic and infodemic spreading, first, we find that information heterogeneity and its induced variation in human responses significantly increase the complexity of the government intervention decision. The complexity results in a dilemma between the socially optimal intervention that is risky for the government and the privately optimal intervention that is safer for the government but harmful to the social welfare. Second, via counterfactual analysis against the COVID-19 crisis in Wuhan, 2020, we find that the intervention dilemma becomes even worse if the initial decision time and the decision horizon vary. In the short horizon, both socially and privately optimal interventions agree with each other and require blocking the spread of all COVID-19-related information, leading to a negligible infection ratio 30 days after the initial reporting time. However, if the time horizon is prolonged to 180 days, only the privately optimal intervention requires information blocking, which would induce a catastrophically higher infection ratio than that in the counterfactual world where the socially optimal intervention encourages early-stage information spread. These findings contribute to the literature by revealing the complexity incurred by the coupled infodemic-epidemic dynamics and information heterogeneity to the governmental intervention decision, which also sheds insight into the design of an effective early warning system against the epidemic crisis in the future.

Keywords: COVID-19; Coupled dynamics; Government response dilemma; Information blocking; Information heterogeneity; Information injection.

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2023, Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.